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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-2-l02(3)(j) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants agree with Plaintiffs' Statement of the Case with the 
following exceptions. First, this case arises out of a citation issued to Jeff 
Howe ("Howe"), and his subsequent prosecution. Plaintiffs' statement that 
it arises from an alleged "arrest" is argumentative, not factual. Second, 
Judge Iwasaki dismissed the criminal prosecution of Howe on a directed 
verdict, concluding that the City prosecutors failed to produce "evidence 
establishing [Howe's] criminal intent," or that he "knowingly or 
intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch or made a 
false alarm as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105(1)." Finally, 
Plaintiffs' statement regarding the bases for the trial court's ruling granting 
summary judgment to Defendants is incomplete and overly simplistic. It 
suffices to state that the trial court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF THE FACTS" 
Defendants generally object to the five lettered captions of Plaintiffs' 
Statement of The Facts (designated "A" through "E"). Rather than 
1 
statements of fact supported by citation to the record, they are statements of 
allegation, conclusion, and argument intended to persuade the Court 
regarding facts which they claim support their assertions. These 
introductory paragraphs of argument should be stricken, or at least 
disregarded, by the Court. 
Notwithstanding this objection, Defendants respond to the specific 
paragraphs of Plaintiffs' Statement of The Facts as follows: 
Paragraph 1: No citation to the factual record supports Plaintiffs' 
allegation that any "ongoing" or "heated debate" has existed between 
Plaintiffs and the City for "the past 10 years." This is merely an 
unsupported allegation contained m Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. R 112-
113. In truth, the record demonstrates otherwise. Any such "debate" was 
effectively ended when the City adopted and effectuated a verified response 
ordinance m December 2000 See Plaintiffs' Statement of The Facts, j^ 2, R 
990-9f Plaintiffs'Appendix, No 7. 
Paragraph 6: It is important to note that neither Jeny nor Jeff Howe 
were signatones to this advertisement. R 2312. 
Paragraph 8 It is important to note that none of the statements 
attributed to Defendant Shanna Werner ("Werner") m this paragraph had 
anything to do with any of the Plaintiffs 
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Paragraph 11: This statement of "fact" is not accurate, and takes 
Werner's deposition out of context. Werner clearly testified in her 
deposition that this statement "may have been [true] that week. It may have 
been a bad week for Peak Alarm customers to call me," and that she does 
not specifically remember the "context or the time frame of when I wrote 
that." R. 2391 at 288:21-24. She further testified that in her experience as 
Alarm Coordinator for the Salt Lake City Police Department, she did not 
believe that Peak Alarm had more complaints than all the other alarm 
companies put together. She testified, cc[n]o. Peak has had their share of 
complaints. No, I would not say it was more." Id. at 289:11-12. 
Paragraph 12: Defendants object to the argumentative and conclusory 
statements made by Plaintiffs in paragraph 12 regarding Werner and Bryant 
"tarring" the alarm industry and Peak Alarm specifically, or that they 
"deployed threats" toward any Plaintiff. No record citation supports this 
allegation regarding Peak Alarm specifically. Again, it is important to note 
that none of the six cited statements or alleged actions in this paragraph have 
anything to do with Peak Alarm, Jerry or Jeff Howe specifically. 
Defendants further object to Plaintiffs' editorialization in 
subparagraphs e and f Werner did not "threaten" anyone at the alarm 
industry conference, nor did Bryant give a "preview" of what the City would 
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"bring dowi i on I lowe ji ist weeks later " Vhcsr :\r^\^^c^::iV\ c --vi 
misleading comments should be stricken or disregarded by the Court. 
Paragraph 23 : It is important to note that Peak Alarm's dispatcher, 
Brooke Mills, called Salt Lake ('\\\ Police i) i>pjidi to simply report a 
b u rg 1 ai al ai 1 1 1 a.t a b i i s i n e s s, an d 11 i at t v o k i d s 1 I ad i i 11 I 11 I t o 11 :i. e s c h o o 1. 
Paragraph 25: i;i-:••.-•" * •-- • • • :-.-r \- - . , - P - T I T N . - ,.\ 
Howe that there was a "panic" situation at West High. Petersen told Howe 
there was an "emergency situation" at West High - an alarm, unknown 
intruders, verification at the scene, but the police would not respond R. 
/'/'-•_ ai * •'•. Petersen did not give Howe any specific information regarding 
W;K> '-> as <.': •.•'..": " ' '-s;" ; ing to Petersen, I l owe then called Salt 
! ulc i 'itv I ):<natuh. 
According to Mills, she told Howe she "had a burglar alarm at West 
High School, that there was a woman inside that worked there and stated 
that there was two people inside the school that weren ' t supposed to be 
there tl iat si ic war ited i I le to dispatel i tl le police, and 1:1 lat tl ie police woi ild 
i lot respond ' R. 8 7 ? at 28:1 3 19 Mills testifiec 1 that sh< * did i lot recall ri 
she told Howe whether the woman appeared to be panicked, or whether she 
said it was an emergency situation. R. 822-23 at 28:23 to 29:3. At that 
point, Howe told Mills he would take care of it, and Mills went back to her 
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desk. R. 823 at 29:4-6. When she returned to her desk, she put the alarm on 
hold and continued with other alarms. Id. at 29:7-10. 
Paragraph 26: The quoted portion of the transcript of Howe's report 
to Salt Lake City Dispatch clearly demonstrates that he called in "an actual 
burglar alarm." R. 831 at 3:1-5. In fact, he stated it was an "alarm" twice. 
He abruptly changed his report upon discovering that the police department 
did not respond to burglar alarms, reporting that it was really "an actual 
burglary in progress." Id. at 3:8-9. The police dispatcher, Joann Ryan 
("Ryan"), challenged Howe's report of a "burglary in progress," stating that 
Peak Alarm's dispatcher (and Howe himself) stated it was merely an alarm. 
Howe then stated that "my guard" was on scene and asking for police 
assistance. 
The remainder of the conversation, conveniently omitted by Plaintiffs 
in their brief, is particularly telling. 
Howe: Okay. And I'll talk to her about that just to clarify that, but no, 
this is an actual break-in. 
Ryan: And where do we meet you guard at? 
Howe: Just in front of the school. 
Ryan: Is he in uniform or she? 
Howe: Yes, he is. 
Ryan: Alrighty. 
R. 831-32 at 3:19 to 4:8. 
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Paragraph 42; Any claimed error in Officer Wihongi's report is 
immaterial and irrelevant to the issues presented in this appeal. 
Paragraph 43: Any claimed omission in Officer Wihongi5s report is 
immaterial and irrelevant to the issues presented in tl lis appeal. 
Paragraph 4y ; ! —.—-/d V ^ \ ^ - ! : ' '-' - • -
 f .:
j
'a^r:ip 
Plaintiffs, taken out of context and in isolation, is misleading. In this portion 
of his deposition, Bryant was explaining why he took it upon himself to 
issue a citation to Howe, rather than asking a subordinate to do it. The 
investigating officer on the scene at West High School, Officer Wihongi, 
clearly testified that h is investigation led him to conclude that I lowe 
intentionally misled police dispatchers and police officer's by providing false 
information in order to initiate a police response he could not otherwise 
obtain, and he passed his conclusions on to Bryant. /?. / / 72-73 at 75:17 to 
76:2; R. 1175-76 at 78:10to 79:1; R. 1179 at 116:5-8; R. 1180 at 117:11-
1 * - : / v ,; , - „ 'i a M J . W / - ''v/_ *. 
Paragraph 56: ' I his statei nei it ol fact is ii icomplete and n lisleading. 
In addition to the factors identified by Plaintiffs in this paragraph, Bryant 
also based his probable cause determination on the fact that Howe reported a 
burglary in progress, rather than a simple alarm. R, 2148 at 94:23-25; 2150 
at 102:25 to 103:11 and 1(14:9-14. Bryant and Wihongi both concluded that 
6 
when Howe reported a burglary in progress to police dispatch, he knew that 
his report was false. Id. 
Paragraph 57: See response to paragraph 56. 
Paragraph 58: See response to paragraph 56. 
Paragraph 61: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the 
issues on appeal. 
Paragraph 62: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the 
issues on appeal. 
Paragraph 63: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the 
issues on appeal. 
Paragraph 64: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the 
issues on appeal. 
Paragraph 65: The facts asserted in this paragraph are irrelevant to the 
issues on appeal. 
Paragraph 66: Werner's opinions regarding Howe's knowledge or 
intent are irrelevant to the issues on appeal. Further, Werner did not testify 
that she has no "information" whether Jeff Howe "knowingly" provided 
false information. She testified that she had no "evidence" of such. 
Werner's inability to read Howe's mind is admitted. 
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Paragraph 67: This assertion of "fact" is blatantly false and contrary 
to the factual record. Officer Wihongi testified repeatedly that he believed 
that Jeff Howe knowingly provided false information to SLCPD dispatch. "I 
beiiex c ne [\ iowe] gave inaccurate information to initiate a police response." 
R 117 2 at 7 5; ! 8 In response to tl ic followii ig qi lestioi i by com isel, "Do you 
believe, as yoi i sit here today, that he [I Iowe] intentiona by gave inacci irat e 
information? . . . That is, he gave information that he knew was false?," 
Wihongi replied "Yes." Id. at 75:20-76:2. He testified that "I think that 
there was enough evidence that I collected that Jeff Howe intentionally 
u !b:Cv.. p o , t ^ . ;-.J.-..C:.- a .. .r^paLcnei ^ vji! mai Ua\ - > (•.: ' 0 - < v 
probable cause to suggest that he gave misinformation to the Police 
Department when they responded on this alarm." 11 1180 at 117:12-15. In 
spite of his consistent and firm responses regarding his belief that Howe 
gave false information, counsel pressed Officer Wihongi to do the 
n i rpossible, t : • x»i x ic i ip " ? ;it! I 1 lard evidence o1 wl i at was oi I Jeff] lowe's 
mind when he called dispatch. Officer Wihongi acknowledged :h*n iv 7\-A 
not know. It 1190-92 at 185:4-7, 186:16 to 187:6. 
Paragraph 74: The inadmissible opinions of Ron Walters should be 
stricken or disregarded by the Court. 
8 
Paragraph 75: The inadmissible opinions of John Mabry should be 
stricken or disregarded by the Court. 
Paragraph 76: Werner's opinions regarding the potential success of 
Howe's prosecution are irrelevant to the issues on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly concluded that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 
a lack of probable cause. The probable cause standard is a "practical, 
nontechnical conception," designed to operate in conjunction with the 
"commonsense," "practical considerations of everyday life," rather than the 
elaborate rules employed by "legal technicians." Probable cause requires 
"only a probability of substantial chance of criminal activity," rather than 
"an actual showing of such activity." 
Here, under the totality of the circumstances, Bryant had probable 
cause to believe Howe violated the false alarm statute. Howe reported a 
"burglary in progress," an "actual break-in," when in reality it was only an 
alarm call from West High School after two teenage girls walked into the 
school when school was not in session. Howe claimed that a uniformed 
male guard had visually confirmed the burglary in progress, and would meet 
officers in front of the school. In reality, the person reporting the alarms was 
a female cafeteria worker. The investigating officer concluded that Howe 
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intentionally and knowingly provided false information of the crime to 
police dispatch m order to obtain a police response that he could not have 
otherwise gotten Based on this information, Bryant issued a misdemeanor 
citation to Howe, reasonably concluding that probable cause existed to 
believe that Howe committed a violation of the law. 
The fact that Howe won a dnected verdict m his criminal trial does 
not conclusively establish a lack of probable cause, and Plaintiffs' claims of 
estoppel do not apply because the parties, issues and standards between the 
criminal trial and this civil action are entirely different. 
The trial court properly applied the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
to this case, holding that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants acted with 
fraud or malice, as required m the notice of claim provisions of the 
Immunity Act. The trial court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed to file a 
compliant notice of claim withm one yeai of the accrual of then causes of 
action Even if this Couit disagiees, Plaintiffs' causes of action would have 
been dismissed on other grounds, so the trial court's error (if any) would be 
haimless 
Finally, the Defendants weie properly granted qualified immunity on 
Plaintiffs' fedeial civil rights causes of action Plaintiffs failed to 
demonstiate a lack of piobable cause, there is no Fourth Amendment 
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malicious prosecution claim where, as here, Howe was never incarcerated, 
and the trial court properly dismissed new causes of action that were first 
raised by Plaintiffs in their opposition to summary judgment. Further, 
Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims fail due to their inability to 
demonstrate any extreme or outi'ageous conduct on the part of Defendants 
that is truly conscience shocking. Finally, the City and supervisory 
Defendants were properly dismissed because there is no competent evidence 
to support Plaintiffs' claims of ongoing tortuous conduct, failure to 
discipline, unconstitutional policy, or personal participation by the 
supervisory defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING 
THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE A 
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
Plaintiffs are correct in conceding that their claims in this matter 
largely stand or fall on the issue of probable cause. To succeed in their 
claims, Plaintiffs, not Defendants, must allege and prove that Defendants 
lacked probable cause to cite and prosecute Jeff Howe. Wilder v. Turner, 
490 F.3d 810, 813-14 (10™ Cir. 2007) (plaintiff must prove lack of probable 
cause in § 1983 action for unlawful arrest); Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 
11 
250, 258 and 265-66 (2006) ("In an action for malicious prosecution after an 
acquittal, a plaintiff must show that the criminal action was begun without 
probable cause for charging the crime m the first place;" plaintiff must prove 
lack of probable cause m First Amendment retaliation claim). 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that the 
probable cause standard is a "practical, nontechnical conception," designed 
to operate m conjunction with the "commonsense," "practical considerations 
of everyday life," rather than the elaborate rules employed by "legal 
technicians." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983). Probable cause 
requires "only a probability of substantial chance of criminal activity," rather 
than "an actual showing of such activity." New York v. PJ, Video, Inc , 475 
U.S. 868, 877-78 (1986). Under this standard, innocent conduct may 
inevitably support some showings of probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 
243 n. 13; see also Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 734 (1984) 
(recognizing that "probable cause does not demand the certainty we 
associate with formal trials"). 
While Plaintiffs spend considerable time attempting to convince this 
Court that Howe was not guilty of making a false report, that is not the issue 
befoie the Court. A finding of probable cause rests not on whether 
particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but on the "degree of suspicion 
12 
that attaches" to the Defendants' evidence. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
119, 128 (2000); United States v. Soto, 375 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(probable cause does not require facts sufficient for a finding of guilt). 
Measuring the degree of suspicion that attaches to a set of facts requires this 
Court to view the Defendants' evidence through the lens of those "versed in 
the field of law enforcement," not applying the "library analysis" employed 
by constitutional "scholars." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). 
A. 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 
A LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE UNDER THE 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
In examining the events leading up to the citation and prosecution of 
Howe, and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, viewed from 
the standpoint of an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer, this 
Court must conclude, as the trial court did, that Plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate a lack of probable cause. 
Here, Sgt. Bryant had probable cause to believe that Jeff Howe 
violated Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105. It is undisputed that on June 27, 2003, 
at approximately 8:46 a.m., the burglar alarms at West High School were 
triggered. It is further undisputed that a Peak Alarm employee called Salt 
Lake City Police Department ("SLCPD") Dispatch to request that SLCPD 
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officers respond to the scene, but was told that officers would not respond to 
a burglar alarm. Howe, after being informed that SLCPD officers would not 
respond, admits that he called SLCPD Dispatch and told them that a Peak 
Alarm guard was on scene asking for police assistance, that the guard 
visually verified a "burglary in progress" (rather than merely a burglar 
alarm), that it was "an actual break-in," that "my guard is asking for police 
assistance," that the guard could be found "just in front of the school," and 
that "he" [the guard] was wearing a unifomi. No evidence exists that 
anyone told Howe that this was a "burglary in progress" or an "actual break-
in," or that any male guard was on scene and in unifomi. Regarding his last 
representation of the guard in unifomi, it is important to keep in mind that 
the caller from the school, Diane Hoyt, is a woman. All of these reports to 
police dispatch by Howe were admittedly and undisputedly false statements. 
It is further undisputed that Officer Wihongi, the investigating officer 
on the scene that day, spoke with Howe by telephone twice regarding his 
report to police dispatch. In his first conversation with Howe, Officer 
Wihongi testified that Howe admitted that he made "assumptions" that 
turned out to be untrue, but stated that he did "whatever it takes" to get a 
police response. Based on his conversations with Howe and his 
investigation of the West High School incident, Officer Wihongi concluded 
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that Howe intentionally gave inaccurate information to SLCPD Dispatch that 
he knew was false in order to initiate a police response. Officer Wihongi 
communicated his conclusions to Sgt. Bryant both verbally in a face-to-face 
meeting and through his written report. 
Sgt. Bryant was entitled to rely on the information provided to him by 
Officer Wihongi in his report and the conclusions he reached as the 
investigating officer on scene, as long as his reliance was reasonable. See 
Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000) ("police officers are 
entitled to rely upon information relayed to them by other officers in 
detemiining whether there is reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative 
detention or probable cause to arrest"); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 
221, 231 (1985) ("[ejffective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless 
police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one 
officer to another"). Sgt. Bryant then consulted with a city prosecutor, Holly 
Barringham, to informally screen the facts of this incident and whether any 
statute had been violated. Ms. Barringham advised Sgt. Bryant that, in her 
opinion, the facts of this case fit within the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-9-105, and that the issuance of a citation would be an appropriate course 
of action. In reliance on the conclusions reached by Officer Wihongi in his 
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investigation, and Ms. Barringham's legal advice, Sgt. Bryant proceeded 
forward with issuing a citation to Jeff Howe. 
In Utah, seeking the advice of counsel is a defense to a malicious 
prosecution action where the issue is whether particular conduct meets the 
elements of some crime, supporting the officer's good faith and negativing 
any malice. Blonquist v. Summit County, 483 P.2d 430, 436 fn. 11 (Utah 
1971); Perkins v. Stephens, 503 P.2d 1212, 1213 (Utah 1972). "An accuser 
may justifiably rely on the advice of counsel as to the existence of probable 
cause only if the advice is sought in good faith and after a full disclosure to 
counsel of the accuser's knowledge and information based on a reasonable 
investigation by the accuser." Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 
151, 160 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). This defense includes reliance on 
a prosecuting attorney's conclusion that a prima facie case exists. Id. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) A person is guilty of making a false alarm if he initiates or 
circulates a report or warning of any fire, impending bombing, or 
other crime or catastrophe, knowing that the report or warning is false 
or baseless and is likely to cause . . . public inconvenience or alarm or 
action of any sort by any official or volunteer agency organized to 
deal with emergencies. 
The facts of this case demonstrate that any reasonable officer would 
have probable cause to believe that Howe violated Utah law. There is no 
dispute that Howe reported a burglary in progress at West High School that 
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had been verified, when in reality, there were only burglar alarms going off 
due to teenagers reportedly walking into the building. No evidence of any 
crime was discovered. Contrary to Plaintiffs5 assertions, Defendants have 
not admitted that any crime occurred. Further, there is no dispute that Howe 
falsely reported that a male Peak Alarm guard was on-scene, in uniform, and 
would meet the officers in front of the building. Finally, the investigating 
officer talked with Jeff Howe twice about his report, and concluded that 
Howe intentionally reported false information to SLCPD Dispatch that he 
knew was false in order to initiate a police response which he could not 
otherwise obtain. Thus a prudent officer would be reasonable in his belief 
that Howe violated state law under the circumstances. 
Howe's justifications for his actions do not affect the probable cause 
determination. "Once Defendants concluded that the initially discovered 
facts established probable cause, they were under no obligation to forego 
arresting Plaintiff or release him merely because he said he was innocent." 
Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1481 (10th Cir. 1995). Probable cause is an 
objective standard, and is evaluated "in relation to the circumstances as they 
would have appeared to prudent, cautious and trained police officers." 
United States v. Davis, 197 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 1999). Neither Sgt. 
Bryant nor the city prosecutors were under any obligation to withhold the 
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issuance of a citation or commencement of prosecution merely because 
Howe insisted he was innocent. 
Plaintiffs contend there was no probable cause because Sgt. Bryant 
and the City lacked proof of criminal intent to violate state law. To show 
probable cause for intent, "the State must only prove that its theory of intent 
is reasonable.'5 State v. Ingram, 139 P.3d 286, 290 (Utah Ct.App. 2006) 
(additional citations omitted). "Knowledge or intent is a state of mind 
generally to be inferred from the person's conduct viewed in light of all the 
accompanying circumstances." Id., citing State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 
289,1110, 988 P.2d 949; see also State v. Wallace, 2006 UT App 232, \ 23, 
138 P.3d 599 ("The Utah Supreme Court 4ha[s] held that intent to commit a 
crime may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from surrounding 
circumstances." (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 
1} 43, 994 P.2d 177)). "So long as there is some evidence including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of 
the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." Id., citing State v. 
Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 724 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). Significantly, the evidentiary 
standard necessary to "support a reasonable belief that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it" is "relatively low." State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, ffi[ 10, 16, 20 P.3d 300. 
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The City's officers and prosecutors cannot be held to an impossible 
standard of proving, at the pre-citation stage, what Howe's state of mind or 
knowledge was at the time he made his report. This would require City 
officers and prosecutors to read a suspect's mind to develop the level of 
proof plaintiffs argue is required before proceeding with issuance of a 
citation or initiating prosecution. Such a standard would make any action 
based on knowing falsehoods impossible to prosecute. Instead, the 
defendants need only show that their theory of intent was reasonable based 
on Howe's conduct viewed in light of all the accompanying circumstances 
and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 
The reasonable inferences drawn from Howe's conduct, statements, 
and circumstances of the incident support any prudent officer's conclusion 
that Howe knowingly provided a false report. Plaintiffs merely disagree 
with the credibility decisions, inferences and conclusions that the defendants 
elected to draw from those facts. Again, probable cause does not require 
facts sufficient for a finding of guilt. Soto, 375 F.3d at 1222. After 
receiving his citation, Howe was free to argue at trial that his statements 
were not false or were not knowingly false, which he did. 
All of the above arguments equally apply to the prosecutor's decision 
to move forward with the prosecution of Jeff Howe. There was no 
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requirement that they be sure of a conviction, only that their belief that 
Howe's actions may have constituted a violation of state law be reasonable. 
The prosecutors are not required to read Jeff Howe's mind, nor are they 
under any obligation to withhold prosecution merely because of Jeff Howe's 
protestations of innocence. The mere fact that the prosecution resulted in a 
directed verdict for Howe in no way establishes that any constitutional 
violation occurred. Indeed, Howe was provided with due process, and he 
prevailed. Whether or not the City put on a good case regarding Jeff Howe's 
mental state of mind or intentions is irrelevant. The only requirement is that 
their belief that Howe knowingly or intentionally made false representations 
be reasonable under the circumstances. The defendants have met that 
requirement, and plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate, as is their burden, that 
no probable cause existed to cite and/or prosecute Jeff Howe. 
Here, on summary judgment in a civil lawsuit, the question before the 
court is not whether Howe was guilty of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but whether the facts and circumstances within Officer Bryant's knowledge 
were sufficient to warrant a prudent officer in believing that a criminal 
offense may have been committed. Plaintiffs spend considerable effort 
attempting to show that Wihongi and Bryant were unable to read Howe's 
mind with regard to intent. Their inability to do so is conceded. However, 
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Bryant and Wihongi had more than adequate bases to believe that Howe 
may have violated the false alarm statute . 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, an officer's reasonable belief that a 
criminal violation has occurred does not require mind-reading capabilities or 
voodoo magic. "Unless the court is somehow able to open the mind of the 
defendant to examine his motivations, intent is of necessity proven by 
circumstantial evidence." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991). 
Here, defendants need only demonstrate a reasonable belief that Jeff Howe 
knowingly made a false report or warning. "Under the Utah Criminal Code, 
a defendant acts 'knowingly' if 'he is aware of the nature of his conduct.'" 
State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 392, % 11, fn. 5, 174 P.3d 654, quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (Supp. 2007). Defendants need not produce evidence 
that he acted with fraudulent intent, bad motive, or that the false information 
harmed the City. Id. at Tf 15. 
Plaintiffs' arguments regarding statutory interpretation are precisely 
the kind of elaborate rules employed by "legal technicians" and 
"constitutional scholars," not law enforcement officer. They are the 
1
 Plaintiffs include Werner in their allegations regarding probable cause and 
a "rush to judgment." These allegations completely ignore the fact that 
Shanna Werner is not a police officer and has no law enforcement authority 
of any kind, nor is she a lawyer or prosecutor. This absurd allegation is not 
a misuse of state power but rather an invention of it. One cannot misuse 
power that one does not possess. 
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"hypertechnical" constructions that are expressly disallowed by the United 
States Supreme Court. While Plaintiffs claim to argue for a "plain 
language" reading of the false alarm statute, it is they, and not Defendants, 
who seek to stretch the statute "beyond recognition" by imposing 
requirements on the statute that cannot be construed to exist under any plain 
reading of the statute. Viewed through the lens of those "versed in the field 
of law enforcement," as this Court must, it is evident that Plaintiffs have 
failed to demonstrate a lack of probable cause. 
In Utah, a "false statement" is "any incorrect or untrue statement." 
Johnson, 2007 UT App at f^ 11 . It is undisputed that Howe reported a 
"burglary in progress" to SLCPD dispatch when, in fact, it wras simply two 
teenage girls walking into the school. Commonsense dictates the conclusion 
that an alarm being triggered in this situation is not the same as a "burglary 
in progress" or an "actual break-in." This is particularly true where, as here, 
the person making the report is an alarm industry professional who should 
know better, and who stated to a police officer that he did "whatever it 
takes" to get a police response. It is undisputed that Officer Wihongi found 
no evidence of any forced entry, damage, theft or any other crime at West 
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High School". The fact that defendants, in the face of this total lack of 
evidence of a crime, cannot conclusively prove that no burglary actually 
occurred that day is meaningless to a probable cause analysis. 
I. 
JUDGE IWASAKI'S DIRECTED VERDICT DOES NOT 
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH A LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
No presumption regarding the existence of probable cause can be 
established by Judge Iwasaki's ruling on directed verdict because the issues 
before the court were fundamentally different, as were the standards to be 
applied by the court. Judge Iwasaki's ruling found that the evidence 
2
 Plaintiffs dispute that Officer Wihongi did not find any evidence of any 
crime at West High School. However, they do not present any evidence or 
legal argument in support of the commission of any crime that they contend 
occurred at the school. The facts are that two teenage girls reportedly 
walked into West High, no teenage girls were found at the school, no 
damage or theft was discovered, and no evidence of their intent was 
discovered during Wihongi's investigation. "An actor is guilty of burglary if 
he enters or remains unlawfully in a building . . . with intent to commit: (a) a 
felony; (b) theft; (c) an assault on any person; (d) lewdness . . . ; (e) sexual 
battery . . . ; lewdness involving a child . . . ; or (f) voyeurism against a child 
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (emphasis added). UA person is guilty of 
criminal trespass if. . . (a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any 
property . . . (ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of 
another."" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (emphasis added). No evidence 
exists to suggest they entered or remained unlawfully in the building. As 
such, the mere fact that they walked into a public building does not 
constitute evidence of any crime. 
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presented by the prosecutor failed to prove Howe's intent or knowledge 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' numerous erroneous assertions, Judge Iwasaki 
did not rule that "there existed no evidence that Howe committed the crime 
with which he was charged" (Plaintiffs' Brief at 27), that "Howe had more 
than sufficient reason to believe a crime was occurring at West High 
School" (Plaintiffs' Brief at 30), or that there is "no evidence . . . that Howe 
violated the statute" (Plaintiffs' Brief at 32). This was a criminal trial on the 
merits, not a preliminary hearing or a motion to suppress, where the 
existence of probable cause would be at issue before the court. Indeed, the 
ruling makes no mention whatsoever of probable cause. The Olson and 
McKenzie cases cited by Plaintiffs do not support their contention of a 
conclusive presumption of lack of probable cause. 
c. 
ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY 
On page 27 of their brief, Plaintiffs apparently argue that Defendants 
in this matter are estopped from arguing the probable cause issue based on 
Judge Iwasaki5s ruling in Howe's criminal prosecution. They argue 
Defendants had "a full and fair opportunity to present evidence" against 
Howe in the criminal trial, and that the trial court below erred in allowing 
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Defendants to "relitigate" that issue, resulting in what they claim aie 
"conflicting results." This argument is without merit. 
There can be no dispute that Werner and Bryant were not parties to 
Howe's criminal prosecution, and had no opportunity whatsoever to litigate 
these issues. The City prosecutors are not parties to this action. Further, 
Plaintiffs confuse the issues m controversy m the two actions. In the 
criminal trial, the issue was whether the prosecution produced evidence that 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Howe intended to make a false 
report, or knowingly or intentionally provided a false report. The 
prosecution failed to satisfy Judge Iwasaki on those elements, and Howe 
prevailed on his motion for a directed verdict. Here, the issue is whethei the 
information known to Defendants, and the reasonable inferences drawn 
theiefrom, gave them a leasonable basis to believe that Howe may have 
committed a crime. 
Because the parties, issues and standards presented m the two cases 
are not identical, estoppel does not apply. 
fl. 
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim 
(Plaintiffs' Appx. No. 5) failed to strictly comply with the requnements of 
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Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("the Immunity Act"), Utah Code Ann § 
63-30-1 et seq As framed by Plaintiffs m this appeal, the trial court's ruling 
on this issue was limited to the mdividually-named Defendants. The trial 
court dismissed all state law claims against the City on other grounds which 
are not at issue m this appeal. 
The Immunity Act governs all lawsuits brought against governmental 
entities and/or their employees,3 and provides immunity from suit for 
governmental entities unless otherwise waived Id. § 63-30-3. Employees 
of governmental entities are similarly immune for conduct undertaken m 
their official capacities during the performance of their duties, withm the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority. Id. § 63-30-4(3). 
The Immunity Act requires the filing of a notice of claim as a 
prerequisite to suit. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2). The notice must be 
submitted withm one year after the claim anses, and must be filed with the 
City Recoider. Id at § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(n)(a). Such notice is required 
regardless of whethei the suit is against the City oi its employees. Madsen 
v Bortlnck, 769 P 2d 245, 249-50, 252 (Utah 1988) 
3
 The Immunity Act was lepealed and le-enacted as Utah Code Ann § 63-
30d-l 01 et seq effective July 1, 2004 However, it is undisputed that all 
relevant allegations m this case occurred pnoi to the effective date of the 
Immunity Act's lepeal Theiefore, the provisions of Utah Code Ann § 63-
30-1 et seq apply to all of Plaintiffs' state law claims 
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Utah law mandates strict compliance with the requirements of the 
Immunity Act. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 37 P.3d 1156, 
1159 (Utah 2001). A claimant must comply with the requirements of the 
Immunity Act to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the district court. 
Id. Failure to comply with the Immunity Act's requirements mandates that 
the district court dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Id. See also, e.g., Houghton v. Department of Health, 2005 UT 
63, ^ 20, 125 P.3d 860 (strict compliance with notice requirements of 
Immunity Act is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction); Gurule v. 
Salt Lake County, 2003 25, \ 5, 69 P.3d 1287 (same). 
"[T]o recover against a governmental employee personally for injuries 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, a plaintiffs sole 
remedy is through the Immunity Act, and to properly state a claim for relief, 
the plaintiff must allege fraud or malice." Straley v. Halliday, 2000 UT App 
38, f 12, 997 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah Ct.App. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs 
failure to allege fraud or malice against governmental employee in notice of 
claim divested court of subject matter jurisdiction), citing U.C.A. § 63-30-
4(3) and (4);4 Day v. State ex rel Utah Dep *t of Public Safety, 980 P.2d 
4
 This section provides in part: 
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), an action under this 
chapter against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
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1171, 1186 (Utah 1999) ("Government employees are now personally liable 
only for fraud or malice."). 
Plaintiffs5 Notice of Claim did not allege that the individual 
defendants acted due to fraud or malice. Significantly, in opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs erroneously argued 
to the trial court that Defendants relied on the wrong version of the 
Immunity Act. R. 1983, 1988-90. They argued that the 2004 re-enacted 
version (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-101 et seq.) applied, and that their Notice 
of Claim only needed to allege "willful misconduct" against the individual 
Defendants. As a result, Plaintiffs never raised the argument before the trial 
court that their Notice of Claim alleged fraud or malice against the 
individual Defendants. 
caused by an act or omission that occurs during the performance of 
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive remedy. 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or 
proceeding based upon the same subject matter against the employee 
or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice .. . 
(4). . . [N]o employee may be held personally liable for acts or 
omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, unless it 
is established that: 
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice . . . 
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The trial court properly applied the correct version of the Immunity 
Act, ruling that Plaintiffs failed to file a compliant Notice of Claim within 
one year of the accrual of their causes of action5. The re-enacted version of 
the Immunity Act in 2004 clearly provided: 
It is the intent of the legislature that: 
(1) injuries alleged to be caused by a governmental entity that 
occurred before July 1, 2004, be governed by the provisions of Title 
63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act; and 
(2) injuries alleged to be caused by a governmental entity that 
occurred on or after July 1, 2004, be governed by the provisions of 
Title 63, Chapter 30d, Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. 
Laws 2004, c. 267, 48. See also, Code v. Utah DepL of Health, 2007 UT 
App 390, ^ 2 fh. 3, 174 P.3d 1134; Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 
2007 UT 84, U 3, fh. 2, 173 P.3d 166; Houghton v. DepL of Health, 2005 UT 
63, Tf 3, fin. 2, 125 P.3d 860. 
Because all of the injuries alleged by plaintiffs undisputedly occurred 
prior to July 1, 2004, the Immunity Act cited by defendants, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-1 et seq., applied to, and barred, all of Plaintiffs' state law claims 
against the individual Defendants. 
s
 Plaintiffs misconstrue the trial court's ruling when they assert that the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants based solely on 
Plaintiffs' untimely filing of their Notice of Claim. The trial court did not so 
rule. The trial court's grant of summary judgment was based on Plaintiffs' 
failure to file a Notice of Claim which complied with the fraud and malice 
requirement within one year of the accrual of their claims. 
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Plaintiffs did not dispute that their Notice of Claim failed to allege 
fraud or malice before the trial court. Because they failed to raise the issue 
below, it is waived on appeal. "[A]s a general rule, claims not raised before 
the trial court may not be raised on appeal." Tschaggeny v. Millbank Ins. 
Co., 2007 UT 37, *{ 20, 163 P.3d 615. This preservation rule gives "the trial 
court an opportunity to address the claimed error and, if appropriate, correct 
it." Id. Furthermore, "requiring preservation of an issue prevents a party 
from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on 
appeal if the strategy fails." Id. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs have waived this issue and failed to preserve 
their right to raise it on appeal. 
Even if this Court decides to consider this issue, it should still affirm 
the trial court's ruling for several reasons. First, the Notice of Claim does 
not allege that the individual Defendants acted with fraud or malice. The 
use of the word "malicious" in generally alleging a malicious prosecution 
cause of action against the City and its employees in general does not satisfy 
the Immunity Act's requirements. Similarly, the use of the word 
"maliciously" in quoting the provisions of the Utah Citizen Participation in 
Government Act ("UCPGA") fails to comply. 
Second, the UCPGA cause of action was dismissed on other grounds 
not at issue in this appeal. Thus, any possible inference of fraud or malice 
against any individual Defendant must be limited to this cause of action 
only. 
Third, the only causes of action dismissed for failure to comply with 
the Immunity Act were Plaintiffs' False Arrest/Imprisonment and Malicious 
Prosecution claims. Even assuming the trial court erred in dismissing these 
claims for failure to comply with the Immunity Act's notice of claim 
requirements, such error (if any) was harmless. Plaintiffs' False 
Arrest/Imprisonment claims would have been dismissed anyway for failure 
to comply with Utah's one-year statute of limitations, which provides that an 
action for cclibel, slander, false imprisonment, or seduction" must be brought 
within one year. U.C.A. § 78-12-29(4). 
There is no dispute that Howe alleges he was "arrested" on July 21, 
2003. In Utah, a claim for false arrest/imprisonment arises on the date of the 
claimed "arrest." Tohnan v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 560 P.2d 
1127, 1128 (Utah 1977). The same is true for federal § 1983 actions 
alleging false arrest. State statutes of limitations for false arrest apply, and 
the limitation period begins to run when the alleged false imprisonment 
ended. Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1094-97 (2007). Therefore, 
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Plaintiffs must have filed their action for false arrest/imprisonment by July 
21, 2004. Because the Complaint in this matter was not filed until April 7, 
2005, Plaintiffs failed to comply with the one year statute of limitations. 
Even if this Court determines that Howe's alleged false arrest 
continued until he was afforded "legal process," Plaintiffs' Complaint is still 
untimely. After the citation issued to Jeff Howe was filed with the Salt Lake 
City Justice Court, Jeff Howe, through his attorney Richard A. Van 
Wagoner, filed a Notice of Appearance, Substitution of Counsel, and Entry 
of Not Guilty Plea on July 28, 2003. The certified Justice Court 
docket shows the date of entry of Howe's Notice and Plea as July 30, 
2003. Therefore, his cause of action for false arrest/imprisonment accrued 
no later than July 30, 2003. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Wallace v. Kato, 111 S.Ct. 1091 (2007), is 
misplaced. In Wallace, the plaintiff was arrested and detained in jail until 
his trial date. The Wallace Court determined that a "false imprisonment 
consists of detention without legal process," and "ends once the victim 
becomes held pursuant to such process - when, for example, he is bound 
over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. at 1096 (emphasis in 
original, citations omitted). The Court further stated: "If there is a false 
arrest claim, damages for that claim cover the time of detention up until 
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issuance of process or arraignment, but not more." Id. The Court concluded 
that a false imprisonment ends "either when the victim is released or when 
the victim's imprisonment becomes 'pursuant to [legal] process.5" 
Mondragon v Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082-83 (10th Cir 2008) (quoting 
Wallace, 127 S Ct. at 1096 (emphasis omitted)). Thus, the claimant's claim 
accrues either on the date of his release or on the date of legal process. 
Mondiagon, 519 F.3d at 1083. 
Here, Jeff Howe was never arrested, was never put m jail, nor was he 
otherwise detained m any way prior to trial He was released immediately 
upon issuance of the citation on July 21, 2003. Even m the unlikely event 
that Howe can demonstrate that he was detained, sufficient legal process was 
instituted when the Information was filed with the Justice Court on July 29, 
2003, and Howe entered his not guilty plea on July 30, 2003. In Utah, a 
prosecution is "commenced" upon the filing of an Information Utah Code 
Ann § 77-2-2(3)6. Further, when a citation has been issued, cc[a]n 
information shall be filed and proceedings held m accordance with the Rules 
of Criminal Piocedure and all other applicable provisions of this code if the 
peison cited: . . . (b ) pleads not guilty to the offense chaiged." Utah Code 
Ann § 77-7-21(2)(b). Thus, legal proceedings weie clearly instituted and 
6
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-2-2(3) provides" "Commencement of prosecution" 
means the filing of an information or an indictment." 
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process initiated against Jeff Howe upon the filing of the Information on 
July 29, 2003, and at the very latest, on July 30, 2003, when Howe entered 
his not guilty plea. Howe's false arrest/imprisonment claims are clearly 
time-barred. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs5 malicious prosecution claims would have been 
dismissed on other grounds. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a lack of 
probable cause (as argued above), failed to demonstrate that any individual 
Defendant (other than Bryant, arguably) initiated, instituted or procured 
Howe's prosecution, and set forth no admissible evidence of malice (other 
than bare allegations, conclusory statements, speculation, conjecture and 
hearsay, none of which are admissible) on any individual Defendants' part. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY TO THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS. 
At the outset, Plaintiffs erroneously place the burden of proof on 
Defendants regarding probable cause. As set forth in Part I. above, to 
succeed in their claims, it is Plaintiffs who must allege and prove that 
Defendants lacked probable cause to cite and prosecute Howe. Wilder v. 
Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 813-14 (10TH Cir. 2007) (plaintiff must prove lack of 
probable cause in § 1983 action for unlawful arrest); Hartman v. Moore, 547 
U.S. 250, 258 and 265-66 (2006) ("In an action for malicious prosecution 
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after an acquittal, a plaintiff must show that the criminal action was begun 
without probable cause for charging the crime in the first place;" plaintiff 
must prove lack of probable cause in First Amendment retaliation claim). 
A. 
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURE CLAIM. 
Regarding Plaintiffs5 arguments on their Fourth Amendment seizure 
claims, it bears repeating that this cause of action is subject to dismissal for 
failure to demonstrate lack of probable cause (as argued in Part LA. above) 
and failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitations (as argued in 
Part II above). 
Next, while the trial court correctly interpreted the Martinez case in 
light of the facts at issue here, and correctly concluded that no Fourth 
Amendment seizure occurred as alleged by Howe, whether or not a seizure 
actually occurred is not really important. The real question on appeal is, did 
the trial court correctly rule that Plaintiffs failed to show, as a matter of law, 
that Defendants acted without probable cause? That question is not 
addressed by Plaintiffs in Part III. A of their brief regarding qualified 
immunity on their Fourth Amendment seizure claim. 
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FOURTH AMENDMENT MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in Defendants' 
favor on Plaintiffs' "Fourth Amendment" malicious prosecution claim based 
on Plaintiffs5 failure to show as a matter of law that Bryant did not have 
probable cause to "arrest" Howe. Ruling at 33. Plaintiffs' arguments 
regarding malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment reveal a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the relevant case law. 
Where, as here, Howe was never incarcerated, his claim for malicious 
prosecution must be brought under the Due Process provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1096 ("If there is a false 
arrest claim, damages for that claim cover the time of detention up until 
issuance of process or arraignment, but not more. From that point on, any 
damages recoverable must be based on a malicious prosecution claim and on 
the wrongful use of judicial process rather than detention itself."(citations 
omitted)); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004) ("The 
initial seizure is governed by the Fourth Amendment, but at some point after 
arrest, and certainly by the time of trial, constitutional analysis shifts to the 
Dues Process Clause."); Becker v. Kroll, 340 F.Supp.2d 1230, 1239-40 
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(D.Utah 2004) (Where plaintiff was never incarcerated, her claim for 
malicious prosecution fell under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
Federal case law is clear that Plaintiffs have no cause of action for 
malicious prosecution in this matter under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Further, the "facts51 alleged in support of this 
non-existent cause of action are wrong. Bryant's consultations with his 
subordinate, Werner, regarding what statutes may apply to Howe's actions 
and whether Howe should be cited does not support any allegation that she 
encouraged or caused Howe's prosecution. The assertion that "Werner and 
Bryant set in motion the facts that led to Plaintiffs' injuries" is absurd. 
Plaintiffs' Brief at 42. The record reveals no support for Plaintiffs' assertion 
that Bryant expressed a desire to prosecute a member of the alarm industry, 
and even if he did, so what? It is his job to enforce the laws of the State of 
Utah. Finally, Plaintiffs' citations to the record in support of these "facts" 
provide no such support. Id. 
DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENT PLEADINGS 
"A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or 
theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss 
or for summary judgment because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's 
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pleading requirements." Holmes Dev, LLC v Cook, 2002 UT 38, j^ 31, 48 
P.3d 895 (citations omitted). That is exactly what Plaintiffs did before the 
trial court m opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
only defamation cause of action alleged by Plaintiffs was a state tort claim 
against Werner. Plaintiffs did not allege any federal "stigma plus" cause of 
action against Werner or any other Defendant, and they never sought leave 
of the trial court to amend their Complaint. 
Even if they were adequately pleaded, Plaintiffs' "stigma plus" claims 
necessarily stand or fall on their defamation claims, which were untimely 
filed pursuant to Utah's one-year statute of limitations. Further, Plaintiffs' 
defamation claims could not have survived because they could not have 
proven that any of Werner's comments were defamatory. 
In order to establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must show that 
"the defendants published the statements concerning him, that the statements 
were false, defamatory, and not subject to any privilege, that the statements 
were published with the requisite degree of fault, and that their publication 
resulted m damage." West v Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1007-08 
(Utah 1994). 
Here, Plaintiffs cannot point to any allegedly defamatory statements 
specifically regaidmg Peak Alarm or Jerry Howe. Statements regarding the 
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"alarm industry" could refer to hundreds, if not thousands, of alarm 
companies and individuals nationwide. Such statements do not specifically 
identify any of the plaintiffs with sufficient particularity to be actionable in 
defamation. 
Any allegedly defamatory statements regarding Jeff Howe were not 
false or defamatory. Shanna Werner is entitled to speak her mind publicly 
and express her opinions, as long as she does so in a manner that does not 
publish false factual statements regarding Jeff Howe. None of the 
statements attributed to Shanna Werner contained false information bearing 
on the reputation of Jeff Howe. At best, they are constitutionally protected 
opinion, and are not actionable in defamation. "Expressions of opinion, 
however, are fundamentally different. Opinions are inherently incapable of 
verification; they embody ideas, not facts." West v. Thompson Newspapers, 
872 P.2d 999, 1014 (Utah 1994). "More importantly, expressions of opinion 
are the mainstay of vigorous public debate. Without opinion, such debate is 
virtually nonexistent." Id. The Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll men 
have the inherent and inalienable r ight . . . to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right." Utah 
Const, art. I, § 1. "Because expressions of pure opinion fuel the marketplace 
of ideas and because such expressions are incapable of being verified, they 
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cannot serve as the basis for defamation liability." West, 872 P.2d at 1015. 
Finally, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they were harmed by any 
statements allegedly made about them by Shanna Werner. 
Further, the "stigma plus" claim is analyzed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the trial court clearly concluded that Plaintiffs failed to 
show any extreme conduct on the part of any Defendant, including Werner, 
sufficient to demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of 
potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking. Ruling at 26-27. 
The same arguments apply to Plaintiffs' "non-retaliatory" First Amendment 
claims. 
Finally, there is no First Amendment right to criminal speech. 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (knowingly false statements 
and false statements made with reckless disregard of the truth do not enjoy 
constitutional protection); State v. Mattinson, 2007 UT 7, ^ 7, 152 P.3d 300 
(communications that are false, fraudulent, or otherwise harmful to the 
interests of society made intentionally, knowingly or with reckless disregard 
receive no protection under the First Amendment). 
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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 
In addition to the trial court's findings, as discussed in Part III.C. 
above, that no conscience shocking behavior was demonstrated against 
Defendants, Plaintiffs' claims regarding "substantial evidence" of malicious 
intent on the part of Werner and Bryant are overwrought and inaccurate. 
An especially egregious example is found on page 48 of Plaintiffs' 
brief. In a blatantly misrepresented quote attributed to Shanna Werner, 
Plaintiffs insinuate that she "intended to punish Jeff Howe for his political 
speech, as Shanna Werner put it, to send 'a signal to other alarm 
companies.'" These six words were a small part of a larger quote attributed 
to Ms. Werner in an industry publication, in the context of Jeff Howe's 
prosecution, when she said she hoped that the enforcement of the City's 
ordinance goes well, and that if the jury "lets Peak Alami off the hook, to me 
that's a signal to other alami companies to call Salt Lake City police and tell 
them whatever they want." R. 2523. Obviously, Ms. Werner never stated 
any intention to punish Jeff Howe for political speech, nor did she ever state 
any intention to send any "signal" whatsoever to "other alami companies." 
This egregious manipulation of Werner's words goes far beyond the "sheer 
verbal sophistry" they accuse the Defendants of using, starkly demonstrating 
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the kind of exaggerated and distorted claims they are willing to employ 
against the defendants in this litigation. 
E. 
SUPERVISORY LIABILITY 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment to Chief of Police 
Dinse and Assistant Chief Atkinson. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot 
demonstrate any "pattern of tortuous conduct" against Werner. As argued 
above, Plaintiffs' defamation claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations, and none of Werner's statements were defamatory toward any 
Plaintiff in this matter. Plaintiffs put forward no competent evidence to 
suggest that the City, Dinse or Atkinson failed to discipline Werner at any 
relevant point in time, that she violated any policy or standard for which she 
should have been disciplined, or that the City, Dinse or Atkinson were even 
aware of the alleged need to discipline her. The ratification/encouragement 
of Werner's superiors, as alleged by plaintiffs, are taken wholly out of 
context, had nothing to do with any Plaintiff or relevant events, and/or 
occurred well after the events complained of. Absent a showing of personal 
participation in the events complained of, and an affirmative link between 
the deliberate actions of the supervisor and the alleged constitutional 
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violations of the subordinate, Plaintiffs' claims based on supervisory liability 
must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants/Appellees respectfully request that this Court AFFIRM 
the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment m their favor. 
Dated this 2 ^ - day of April, 2009. 
J. WESLEY ROBINSON 
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for 
Defendants/Appellees 
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